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Abstract
The activation of the still predominantly passive demand side is necessary to further guar-
antee a stable power system in the short term and ensure capacity adequacy in the long run.
A system with a high share of generators with nearly no marginal costs requires new services
that facilitate transmitting the right economic signals to the system stakeholders. To this
end we refine the notion of energy services and propose a framework to systematically design
quality differentiated energy services for consumers. This approach facilitates a value-based
economic assessment of energy services that deviates from the marginal-cost-paradigm. We
further illustrate pricing options for these new energy service products and outline infras-
tructural needs and additional use case-specific product properties. Moreover, we discuss
how the morphological approach can be formalised using a mathematical programming for-
mulation and introduce a complexity measure that facilitates assessing potential adoption
obstacles for end consumers. Additionally, we illustrate the practical applicability of these
findings by using a prototypical implementation of a decision support system. To foster
differentiated energy services, we recommend a more lenient regulatory regime lowering the
barriers for new market entrants.
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1. Introduction
Currently, system stability is primarily ensured by supply side operations, in particu-
lar load balancing through conventional generators and system reserves. This traditional
control approach may become increasingly unreliable due to uncertainty of intermittent re-
newable energy sources and decommissioning of conventional power plants. The increase
of intermittent renewable energy sources on the supply side effectively decreases the share
of controllable elements in the power system. The arising imbalance can be compensated
through activation of the so far mainly passive demand side. To this end, appropriate
economic incentives need to be designed.
However, these economic incentives need to be embedded in attractive service offerings
corresponding to the individual application scenarios for different customer groups. This in
turn requires the development of new products and services and considerations about the
appropriate market environment. Fundamentally, these service offerings need to pave the
way towards a value-oriented pricing paradigm instead of relying on the current marginal-
cost-based assessment for the value of electricity. Marginal-cost-pricing will fail in the long-
run if power systems are increasingly governed by zero-marginal-cost generation with high
output volatility.
Our research objective is to characterise the corresponding energy service concept and
to provide a structured approach to design energy service products for end customers under
consideration of the key product characteristics. To this end we follow Zwicky (1967) and
present a structured morphological approach to explore design dimensions for energy services
encompassing the four categories of risk, pricing options, infrastructural requirements, and
product properties.
First, we further specify what an energy service is in the context of this work and build on
and adapt existing definitions of this term in Section 2. Additionally, we consider previous
work regarding product differentiation in the electricity sector and more general in the service
sector. From these foundations we derive the methodology built on Zwickys framework in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the morphological box for energy services while Section 5
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elaborates on interdependencies between design options and the complexity related to energy
service features. Furthermore, we illustrate the usage of the box by characterising real-
world service configurations and a prototypical decision support system for service designers.
Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications for regulators to support the process
of advancing energy services.
2. Related work
This section revisits existing definitions of energy services and looks into general service
design properties to guide our morphological approach for service innovation in the energy
domain.
2.1. Energy services
The term energy service has different meanings in literature. These meanings can be
classified into three main streams: Understanding the classic business of utilities as a service,
planning, installation and financing of small power plants (e.g., photovoltaic power plants)
and services enabled by the use of energy.
Hill (1977, p. 317) defines a good as “a physical object which is appropriable and,
therefore, transferable between economic units”. In contrast, “one economic unit performing
some activity for the benefit of another” and thereby changing the condition of a person or
a good is the idea of a service (Hill, 1977, p. 318). In line with this reasoning, Kloubert
(2000) identifies two components in the classic core offering of utilities: The energy carrier
(e.g., coal, gas) itself is a typical good. Transmitting this good in a possibly modified form
to customers adds the characteristics of a service. Utility companies extend the so-called
dual core offering by auxiliary services such as metering, consumption optimisation, and
emergency services.
Following Vine (2005), energy services consist of developing, installing and funding multi-
year projects that enhance the energy efficiency or load reduction of customer facilities.
Especially in the US, the literature employs the term “ESCO” (energy service company) to
refer to this definition (Dayton et al., 1998; Goldman et al., 2005; Satchwell, 2010; Vine et al.,
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1999). This is in line with the notion of energy services as defined by Rosmanith et al. (2007)
and the EU directive 2006/32/EC: An energy service is “the physical benefit, utility or good
derived from a combination of energy with energy efficient technology and/or with action,
which may include the operations, maintenance and control necessary to deliver the service,
which is delivered on the basis of a contract and in normal circumstances has proven to lead
to verifiable and measurable or estimable energy efficiency improvement and/or primary
energy savings.”1
In contrast to Vine’s and Hill’s understanding, Sorrell (2007) focuses on the service
itself: “Energy service contracting involves the outsourcing of one or more energy-related
services to a third party”. This includes e.g., basic services like hot water supply or more
sophisticated service offerings, such as illumination levels, room temperatures etc. Seizing
the three-stage-framework of offering a service due to Kloubert (2000), Sorrell adds the
result stage — transforming energy to something valuable for the customer — to the first
two stages. These consist of (1) setting up infrastructures and procuring primary energy
carriers and (2) producing and transmitting the energy, which is the base for the following
considerations.
Building on Sorrell’s definition we understand energy services as services that are facili-
tated by energy, in particular for energy-intensive applications, offered on the mass market.
This notion introduces a new facet that facilitates to provide a value-based assessment of the
utilisation of energy that is differentiated by the end-use application. In turn this enables
new options to harness demand side flexibility potentials which are of great importance in
future energy systems with large shares of intermittent generation sources (IEA, 2014).
2.2. Product differentiation in the electricity sector
Electricity is typically considered as a homogeneous good. Therefore, product differenti-
ation has mainly concentrated on dynamic pricing so far (Tan and Varaiya, 1993). Real-time
pricing (RTP) and other variable pricing schemes are well-known and studied examples (Al-
badi and El-Saadany, 2008; Woo et al., 2014; Borenstein, 2005). Direct load control (DLC)
1Article 3(e), Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the council.
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is another way to manage the balance of demand and supply. In DLC programs utilities
offer incentives to customers in exchange for accepting pre-specified curtailment options (Al-
badi and El-Saadany, 2008). Further work concentrates on differentiation of electricity with
regard to conventional attributes like the generation source (Kaenzig et al., 2013). Recently,
the willingness to pay for green generation options has been extensively studied (Roe et al.,
2001; Borchers et al., 2007; Yoo and Kwak, 2009; Hansla et al., 2008). Depending on the
scenario, most studies find a higher willingness to pay for electricity from renewable sources.
Other network-based industries, e.g., telecommunication, evolved in a comparable way (Ri-
naldi, 2004). Deregulation of the telecommunication market induced competition which
forced the development of innovative and heterogeneous products to account for individual
customer needs (Kenyon and Cheliotis, 2001). In analogy to that, product differentiation in
the electricity sector should not only concentrate on pricing and power quality but also on
different customer usage scenarios. The ongoing implementation of smart grids forms the
technical basis for this development (Woo et al., 2014). This way, the (physically) homoge-
neous good electricity becomes a differentiable transaction object in economic terms (Wein-
hardt et al., 2003).
2.3. Product differentiation in the service sector
Since the notion of energy services builds on the service concept, differentiation can in
particular be attained by a variation of service quality attributes. Service quality has been
subject to extensive research mainly building on top of quality indicators established in the
SERVQUAL framework (Parasuraman et al., 1988). This framework focuses on “traditional”
services performed by humans e.g., in stores, banks, or other businesses. The relevant service
quality dimensions include the perception of tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance,
and empathy. Some of these concepts are also applicable to energy services, but have a
different facet in their implementation. Tangibles for example are not as relevant or cannot
be influenced, as well as empathy, and to some extent assurance, since the service is delivered
through a device or appliance according to clearly defined technical specifications.
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Parasuraman et al. (2005) have also put forward an important modification of the
SERVQUAL concept to reflect the rise of electronic or e-services. The E-S-QUAL frame-
work incorporates insights from numerous studies employing the Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). Its objective is to measure the “ex-
tent to which a website facilitates efficient and effective shopping, purchasing, and delivery.”
The general attitude towards the technological means that deliver a service can also be of
importance for the energy services depicted later, since they too rely on technical interfaces.
However, the focus of our work is to first define and characterise differentiation concepts,
rather than assessing a particular implementation of one. The following main indicators
employed in E-S-QUAL measure the quality of a service: reliability (correct technical func-
tion of a site), responsiveness (low latency and fast customer support), access (easy and
timely), flexibility (choice of payment, shipping etc; rather referred to the delivery process),
ease of navigation, efficiency (simple and effective usage design), assurance/trust (repu-
tation of the site), security/privacy (data security level of the provider), price knowledge
(price determination transparency during the purchasing process), site aesthetics, customi-
sation/personalisation (user profiles).
Several of these indicators are directly applicable to energy service evaluation, in par-
ticular assurance/trust and security/privacy. Others like reliability and responsiveness can
be adapted in a straightforward manner: The reliability of an energy service is intrinsically
connected to the appliance that provides the service. Its reliability will typically be governed
by the availability of energy to the appliance. The responsiveness dimension depends on
user service quality expectations and behavior—e.g., frequency and required immediateness
of service delivery. This plays a crucial role in Section 4.
Service access, flexibility and efficiency require a nuanced interpretation in the energy
domain: Access, for instance, may be restricted due to technical constraints (e.g., insufficient
fuse capacity), or because the respective infrastructure (e.g., smart meter) is unavailable.
Flexibility is employed differently in this work (see Section 4.1). The efficiency of an energy
service is the energy consumption relative to a similar service. Naturally, most of the
other dimensions also play a role for energy services when they are marketed or controlled.
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Furthermore, future energy services can be attributed to the e-service domain as well. This
is because such novel services are enabled by the smart grid ICT layer extending standard
grids. Consequently, the e-service dimensions apply as well and do not require a specific
domain adaptation.
3. Methodology
We seek to approach energy service design in a methodical fashion. To this end, we
tie our research to the economics literature on quality differentiated products and the mor-
phological design theory established by Zwicky (1948). In a nutshell, the economic framing
illustrates the fundamental potential of energy service differentiation and thus establishes
the answers to the “why” energy service innovation is required. Conversely, the morpholog-
ical theory provides a structured approach for design processes and thus facilitates a better
understanding of “how” service innovation can be managed in an effective manner.
3.1. Economics of quality differentiation
At the economic core of our problem stands the idea of companies exercising price dis-
crimination between customers to extract profit. We will provide a quick overview on the
subject matter and refer for an in-depth treatise to the extensive industrial organisation lit-
erature in this field (e.g., Varian, 1989; Tirole, 1988). The standard definition of Pigouvian
price discrimination considers perfect price discrimination (first-degree), direct price dis-
crimination based on observable customer characteristics (third-degree), and indirect price
discrimination based on customer self-selection (second-degree). Highly customised energy
services facilitate second-degree price discrimination.2 Product differentiation through ver-
sioning is the key building block for this approach. To proceed, it is helpful to establish
additional concepts:
2Naturally, third-degree price discrimination also applies when targeting clearly identifiable segments
such as industrial customers or residential customers with special equipment such as PV generation, electric
vehicles or micro-CHP heating.
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• Differentiated products: The products in an industry are differentiated if customers
consider them as (close but) imperfect substitutes.
• Vertically differentiated products: A vertically differentiated product space is charac-
terised by a common preference ordering of the product offerings across customers.3
• Horizontally differentiated products: In a horizontally differentiated product space the
consumers do not agree on the preference ordering.4
In the following, we explore options of establishing quality discrimination in electricity
provision through distinct energy service offerings. As we will see, these differentiation
options allow for both vertical (e.g., reliability level) and horizontal differentiation (time-of-
use brackets) of electricity products.
Product differentiation in power systems. Electricity is a fundamentally homogeneous good
characterised by relevant physical properties (e.g., voltage or current). After all, it was this
standardisation that paved the way for the electrical age. Consequently, there is no such
thing as differentiated electricity. However, product differentiation is enabled by wrapping
the homogeneous commodity in a service offering that is marketing “energy services” instead
of a commodity. This reflects the simple observation that “an end use device uses electric
energy to provide a service to the customer” (Schweppe et al., 1989). It is this service
which customers ultimately benefit from and which explains their willingness to pay. This
differentiated view on electricity consumption paves the way for different forms of product
differentiation through establishment of various quality of service classes, e.g., time of service
delivery or reliability guarantees.
A stylised example. The canonical example for product differentiation of energy services
is due to Chao and Wilson (1987) and reflects a reliability-price trade-off. We present a
3If all products sell for the same price, all consumers choose the same product (the one with the highest
quality).
4If all products are sold at the same price the optimal choice depends on the particular consumer.
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Figure 1: A stylised model of energy service differentation
simplified version to illustrate the potential of increased efficiency by virtue of differentiated
energy services. Assume that there are just two dimensions that customers care about when
selecting an energy service offering—price and service reliability. The customer population is
heterogeneous with respect to their quality requirements and their willingness-to-pay. Such
a stylised market is illustrated in Figure 1. Often, an energy provider may offer a single
homogeneous and hence non-differentiated product to this customer population. In the
Figure this example product is shown with a 99.9% reliability level at a price of 25 cent/kWh.
Only the customers in the top-left quadrant will consume this service. Customers in the
right quadrants require a higher service quality, whereas customers in the bottom quadrants
are priced out of the market.
While this may be the profit-maximising single service offering for the provider, it is
obvious that it simultaneously leads to inefficient over- and underprovision of quality. Con-
sequently, differentiated service offerings (e.g., high reliability-high price, low reliability-low
price) can increase allocative efficiency. The customer pools that the supplier potentially
reaches are labelled A and B — the former group is interested in less costly offers with lower
reliability guarantees, the latter group is willing to pay a premium for higher reliability.
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3.2. Morphological analysis
The morphological approach is a creativity technique for developing different designs for
a certain artifact. It facilitates both surveying the problem area as well as the generation of
concrete solution approaches. Morphological analysis is due to Zwicky who summarised the
approach as a structured analysis of systems (Zwicky, 1948). While historically rooted in
engineering and the design of physical products, the method has also spread into the service
design domain. For example, Lay et al. (2009) apply morphological analysis to explore
service-oriented business models in the B2B context. Similarly, Aurich et al. (2010) develop
service offerings for industrial goods. Recent contributions use the technique to develop
service offerings for electric vehicle ecosystems (Kley et al., 2011; Stryja et al., 2015).
To this end, one compiles a comprehensive list of design dimensions (parameters) de-
scribing generic aspects of the analysed system. Subsequently, one needs to identify concrete
design options (elements) for each parameter. For illustration, consider the following stylised
example: When designing an office chair we can imagine the following parameters uphol-
stery, frame, height adjustment, and backrest. For the upholstery we can choose from the
elements leather, cotton, or plastic. The design elements for the frame are column, tripod,
or quadpod. There may be no height adjustment, one with discrete levels, or a continuous
adjustment. Finally, the back rest can be absent, fixed, retractable. This information is ar-
ranged in matrix form — the so-called morphological box (Zwicky, 1967) — with parameters
as rows and and elements as columns. By selecting one element per parameter (one matrix
cell per row) one can recombine design options to create distinct solution instances. Finally,
one needs to evaluate the individual solution candidates to determine the final choice(s).
Note that the option space exhibits combinatorial growth in parameters and elements
with the gross number of solution options obtaining as
∏
p∈P |E(p)|. In the example we
have 34 = 81 design options for the chair. To limit this solution space explosion one should
search for interdependencies between different elements from different parameters which
facilitate reducing the solution space. In the chair example a reasonable assumption is that
height adjustment is only available for the case of a column frame. This reduces the number
of possible solutions to 45. This observation relates to the two stage product line selection
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Figure 2: Overview of the morphological design options
problem where in the first stage infeasible configurations and dominant features are removed
to improve the performance of the subsequent optimisation (Scho¨n, 2010).
4. Results: A morphological box for Smart Grid services
In the past, product differentiation in the energy service sector was somewhat neglected
due to both a lack of need as well as insufficient technical prerequisites. In the following we
develop a morphological box for designing differentiated energy service offerings (see Figure
2). The morphological approach facilitates a more systematic identification of design options
for transaction objects in future retail energy services. We group design parameters into four
categories — risk, pricing, infrastructure, and product properties. Similar to the approach
described by Kley et al. (2011), we effectively obtain four distinct morphological boxes
mapping different service characteristics. We further describe these individual boxes and
subsequently explore interdependencies between them.
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4.1. Risk parameters
The design elements in the first category enable the service provider to reduce, interrupt,
or shift the amount of delivered energy services and therefore transfer the respective risks
to the customer. Reducing the up-time requirement for specific energy services potentially
reduces overall system costs by increasing demand side flexibility. In practice, an unlimited
risk is unusual because it can result in a complete execution stop. A reasonable service
offering should therefore usually include any type of risk limitation.
Risk in quantity addresses the paradigm of load curtailment. If the risk is limited, it
results in a partial execution of the energy service. Similarly, the service provider could
interrupt an already started energy service in a limited manner in terms of frequency and
duration of the interruption occurrences. For instance in BMW’s ChargeForward program5
customers receive up to $1,540 per year if they allow interruptions of their charging processes
for up to one hour. To account for the load shifting paradigm that directly addresses the
volatile character of renewable energy generation, an energy service can be uncertain about
its time of delivery. Service providers can guarantee their consumers to fulfill the energy
service until a specified deadline instead of immediately executing the service. In accordance
with Chao and Wilson (1987) the three risk parameters are closely related as they converge in
their extremes: Reducing the quantity to the minimum is equal to an unlimited interruption
or shift in time of delivery.
4.2. Pricing parameters
The second group of parameters addresses well-known differentiation features for current
standard electricity products and their design elements for the energy service concept. Prices
of energy services can be uncertain depending on the employed pricing concept. Therefore,
besides having no change announcements, service providers can announce changes with a
predefined lead time or, in the most complex case, as real-time prices in the short-term or
potentially even instantaneous.
5http://content.bmwusa.com/bmwi_pge/index.html
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Beside price changes, the calculation concept defines how an energy service is assessed in
economic terms. The design elements included are flat, linear and non-linear price calculation
concepts. The calculation concept refers in particular to every additional or marginal unit
of a service. In this case a flat concept imposes a fixed fee (again disregarding the variable
usage) that is only limited by the technical line limits to supply the service device and the
ability to actually use the energy service. Every individual can only consume a certain
amount of a service since the outside options or other requirements of daily life usually
oppose its continuous and unlimited use. Nevertheless, since energy has to be produced, this
concept is diminishing energy efficiency efforts and will most likely only play a role when
excess renewable supply is available. Linear calculation concepts relate to the price per unit
consumed and are well-known from traditional electricity rates. Finally, non-linear pricing
can address e.g., shortage situations by imposing non-constant marginal costs of service
provision. Thereby higher usage intensity (e.g., fast EV charging — 20 kWh in 30 minutes)
results in higher service fees than lower usage intensity (slow charging — 20 kWh in 3 hours),
independent of the total amount.
As mentioned before, energy services can in particular be differentiated from “traditional”
energy provision by virtue of the calculation unit. Thereby, usage payments are no longer
based on energy consumption (i.e., kWh) but rather a service purpose-based metric. For
electric vehicles, this is, e.g., the usage time or the distance driven. For an air-conditioning
service, imagine some service level related to lighting and HVAC performance in an office
building. This type of contracting will only be plausible if a service provider installs the
service equipment, e.g., a car-sharing operator (LeVine et al., 2014) or an energy service
company offering performance contracting (Davis, 2012). This way device efficiency is not
a user decision and the service provider can appropriately calculate the business case.6
Further differentiation parameters can be temporal and spatial differentiation. Prices
that have no temporal differentiation are static and do not depend on the time of service
delivery. For variable prices, the underlying price menu may be static (time-of-use pricing)
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this critical qualification.
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or dynamic (RTP). This is reflected by the corresponding choice of the change announcement
parameter. Spatial differentiation captures that different regions can have specific demand
and supply features or network limitations which need to be accounted for in the price, as
is currently discussed in the form of nodal pricing schemes. In contrast to this regional
differentiation, roaming allows customers to use a service at predefined locations for the
same (roaming) price. Finally, the most straightforward design element is a uniform price
for the energy service.
4.3. Infrastructure parameters
Novel price and risk elements in a smart grid service offering will often entail corre-
sponding infrastructure requirements, which in turn may become part of the service bundle
themselves. These will primarily include metering, communication, and control devices
which are supplied by service providers to their contracted customers. This is analogous to
the telecommunication sector where cell phones, routers, or modems are often provided for
the duration of the contract.
Concerning metering equipment, simple service offerings may be realised using legacy
Ferraris meters which facilitate only cumulative meter readings. A first extension of me-
tering capabilities was historically established using dual meters for different time periods
(e.g., night vs day) or usage classes (e.g., interruptible vs non-interruptible). Additional
measurement of peak power is widely used for large industrial customers to penalise power
spikes. The recent introduction of smart meters allows quasi-continuous metering with ar-
bitrary granularity. Still, in most commercial realisations so far suppliers opt for 15 minute
metering intervals.
Historically, meters are oﬄine without any continuous connection to suppliers. How-
ever, communication capabilities can augment the metering infrastructure for novel service
approaches. Unidirectional communication channels allow service providers to push price
updates to customers. Going one step further, bidirectional communication enables cus-
tomers to actively communicate with the service provider. These customer messages may
specify current availability requirements or transmit market orders.
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Finally, customers may install device automation to improve the interaction with novel
service offerings. This way automation can help reduce the perceived complexity of these
services. Automation options range from simple timed or threshold-based switches (e.g.,
maximum payments) to pro-active bid agents adapting to observed and predicted user be-
havior.
4.4. Product property parameters
This group of characteristics introduces specific product category parameters. Following
our guiding example of services for electric loads, candidate parameters include the energy
source (primary energy), the possibility to alter the power profile, and power quality features.
Currently, electricity is mostly differentiated for marketing purposes by the primary
energy source that is converted to electricity in the respective plant type. Utilities hereby
guarantee the energy balance from a specific energy source for the demand of the customer.
This is one of the two design options that emphasise this product property. Well-known
examples for differentiation by energy source are green energy products. The second design
option enhances this idea by guaranteeing the power balance with a specific energy source.
This incorporates a more direct coupling of the energy service with the current availability
of electricity from a specific type of generator. In general, the energy source parameter is
added to an energy service by explicitly defining a specific power plant (e.g., wind turbine)
or a group of power plants that virtually supplies the energy service in either of the above
mentioned shapes. As a consequence this can imply an increased risk of service availability
if the energy source is unavailable.
The second parameter contains the ability to alter the power profile. We follow the
taxonomy of Petersen et al. (2013) and establish design elements in line with their notion
of bakery, batteries, and buckets. The bakery is representative for appliances with a fully
fixed power profile. Batteries allow an alteration of the (energy fixed) power profile as long
as a target energy level is eventually met. An EV charging service is a perfect match for
this group. Fully variable power profiles characterise the bucket class facilitating any load
shape and any total energy amount. An example for this design element are heat pumps,
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relaxing not only the power but also the energy constraint in the given time frame. Ideally,
the service provider can perform these power profile alterations without affecting the energy
service delivered by the appliances.
The final, more technical parameter is power quality. This refers to physical characteris-
tics of electrical power which particularly addresses the needs of commercial and industrial
customers. To allow for a general classification this characteristic has binary design ele-
ments. For instance, customers could require a guaranteed voltage interval for their energy
service, that can be assured by voltage regulated distribution transformers. Or the cus-
tomer’s electrical consumers generate an abnormal amount of reactive power that needs to
be compensated by the service provider to support local grids.
5. Discussion: Use cases for the morphological box
Since its theoretical solution space is rather big we introduce possibilities to assist future
product designers. After introducing a formalisation needed for the consecutive steps, we
discuss interdependencies between design elements in Section 5.1 and present a way to
describe them mathematically. With the creation of diversified products, complexity for the
end consumers becomes an important topic. In Section 5.2 we discuss product complexity
and introduce a complexity scoring rule as an extension of the morphological box. Finally, we
illustrate the functionality of our proposed morphological box by mapping exemplary energy
services to it (Section 5.3) as well as presenting a prototypical decision support system for
service designers (Section 5.4).
For the following discussions we propose a formalisation of the morphological box intro-
duced in Section 4. As indicated in Figure 2 energy services can be described by instantiating
each parameter with a specific design element. For ease of exposition an instantiation of the
morphological box can be represented by means of binary matrices
A =


α1,1 · · · α1,n
...
. . .
...
αm,1 · · · αm,n

 , B =
(
· · ·
)
, Γ =
(
· · ·
)
, ∆ =
(
· · ·
)
. (1)
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Rows reflect design parameters whereas columns represent the corresponding design ele-
ments. If a design option is chosen, the respective binary variable is one and all other design
option variables associated to the characteristic are zero. Clearly, for any valid configuration
we need to verify that all row sums equal exactly one.
5.1. Interdependencies between design options
As discussed in Section 4 there are interdependencies between specific sets of design
options. Determining those is key to increase computational efficiency of the product design
problem. Therefore, we present a way of handling their occurrences to simplify the process
of designing energy services by reducing the theoretical solution space (compare Section 3).
Our intention is not to present a complete enumeration of interdependencies but rather
to show that mathematical expressions can describe invalid combinations of design options
based on illustrative examples.
Most interdependencies exist between either risk (A) or pricing (B) parameters and in-
frastructure (Γ) parameters. If for example one designs an energy service including temporal
differentiation with variable rate periods, necessary metering equipment needs to be con-
sidered: Evidently, such a rate scheme will require continuous metering for correct billing.
This is the simplest form of interdependency and can be formulated as follows:
β4,2︸︷︷︸
variable temporal differentiation
≤ γ1,4︸︷︷︸
continuous metering
(2)
The inequality formulation provides the flexibility to choose non-necessary infrastructure
e.g., to preemptively install sophisticated metering for possible future usage.
In the design phase, it is also possible to formulate more complex relations. For exam-
ple, any type of risk limitation requires interactions between the service provider and the
customer. Depending on the use case the customer’s willingness to take risks might change,
which he or she should communicate to the service provider. Vice versa, during service
delivery the provider needs to inform an appliance about when to start, pause or stop. In
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this case the infrastructure has to support bidirectional communication:
max(α1,2, α2,2, α3,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
limited risk of any A-parameter
≤ γ2,3︸︷︷︸
bidirectional communication
(3)
Note that for unlimited risk unidirectional communication is sufficient as the service
provider only has to signal service interruptions to the consumer without confirmation from
the customer side. Following Equation 3 this can be expressed as follows:
max(α1,3, α2,3, α3,3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unlimited risk of any A-parameter
≤ γ2,2︸︷︷︸
unidirectional
communication
+ γ2,3︸︷︷︸
bidirectional
communication
(4)
Lastly there exists a group of interdependencies where one (or more) design elements
require the existence of multiple other design elements. If we design an energy service with
price changes that either occur with a lead time or even instantaneous, we need to meter its
usage properly and of course we need to communicate these changes to the customer. On the
other hand tariffs without an explicit change announcement, as in the case of TOU pricing,
do not require communication and are therefore excluded in the following constraint:
β1,2 + β1,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
price changes with lead
time or instantaneous
≤ min

 γ1,4︸︷︷︸
continuous
metering
, γ2,2 + γ2,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
uni- or bidirectional
communication

 (5)
As illustrated above, most interdependencies of energy service parameters refer to infras-
tructure. Still, there do exist interdependencies that are not motivated by infrastructural
requirements. For instance, determining a specific (renewable) energy source δ1,3 implicates
an unlimited interruption risk of the energy service α2,3 (compare Section 4.4):
δ1,3︸︷︷︸
power balanced energy
source (here: green)
≤ α2,3︸︷︷︸
unlimited
interruption risk
(6)
5.2. Complexity of energy services
As electricity products are becoming more refined to reflect a changing generation mar-
ket the complexity of such tariffs is another dimension to be considered. We understand
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complexity as the perceived cognitive strain experienced by (potential) users of such a tariff
and the ensuing difficulty of assessing their energy costs, rather than the technical challenge
of its implementation (cf. Layer et al., 2016). Chao and Wilson (1987) already observed that
“a practical difficulty with spot pricing is that the sample space may be so complex that it
would be impossible to implement the spot price in every contingency.” Note that this is
primarily a contracting dimension and not a risk aversion phenomenon. Consequently, we
want to isolate complexity from risk aversion.
To this end, complexity analyses require an assessment of users’ satisfaction with a tariff
or their purchase behavior. In an early study Goett et al. (2000) discovered small businesses’
considerable preference for fixed electricity rates as compared to the more complex TOU
pricing, which is in turn preferred to RTP. However, it remains unclear if this preference
is really a consequence of cognitive strain or of risk aversion. Du¨tschke and Paetz (2013)
extend this conclusion to private users who are sceptic towards more dynamic tariffs but
may reconsider after additional experience with such tariffs. Employing an extensive conjoint
analysis, Gerpott and Paukert (2013) meanwhile find the incentive size of smart tariffs to be
a more important determinant of users’ tariff choice rather than the granularity of temporal
differentiation or the lead time. In an extensive empirical study with a sample of 664
participants, Layer et al. (2016) determine increasing dynamics as a fundamental driver of
perceived complexity. Communication of subscription rebates in percentages is not found to
have a significant impact. Furthermore, the authors find evidence that increased complexity
leads to an overestimation of costs. Therefore, it may have a detrimental effect when it
comes to choosing such tariffs (cf. Homburg et al., 2014).
In essence, tariff complexity negatively influences customer acceptance of an energy ser-
vice and this should be considered when applying the morphological box for energy service
design (cf. Section 5.4). In the morphological design approach, perceived complexity arises
from individual design choices. We surmise that each design option xi,j in the morphological
boxes X ∈ {A,B,Γ,∆} can contribute to the perceived complexity of an energy service.
To express these scores we introduce complexity matrices analogous to the design matrices
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from Equation (1):
CX =


cX1,1 · · · c
X
1,n
...
. . .
...
cXm,1 · · · c
X
m,n

 ∀X ∈ {A,B,Γ,∆} (7)
We suggest ratio scales for the individual weights to facilitate the calculation of an ag-
gregate complexity score of a given energy service. Multiplying a given energy service’s
morphological matrices for each design category with the corresponding transposed com-
plexity matrices yields a square matrix per design category. The traces of these matrices
(sum of diagonal elements) are then the category complexity scores of the given service
design configuration. The sum of all the category traces can in turn be interpreted as a
measure for the total complexity of a specified energy service:
Complexity(Energy Service) =
∑
X
tr(X ·
(
CX
)T
), ∀X ∈ {A,B,Γ,∆} (8)
The linear structure of the complexity score is meant primarily for illustration purposes.
One can easily imagine a convex function on the total sum or a category score to reflect com-
plexity complementarity. Similarly, the highest individual complexity score can determine
the total score.
Clearly, any meaningful evaluation of the complexity score will critically hinge on the
measurement of each design option’s relative contribution to perceived complexity. Mea-
suring these values will be challenging and potentially subjective. However, for a relative
comparison of multiple service configurations under the same complexity premises the ratio
scales can be relaxed to interval scales. Eventually, the outlined method can help support
service marketing activities by providing the foundation to estimate user response to a tariff
created.
5.3. Exemplary products
In this section we present four illustrative examples of differentiated energy service prod-
ucts to demonstrate the application and suitability of the morphological approach.
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5.3.1. Interruptible load
As a first example we discuss an interruptible electricity service as studied by Oren (2013)
that was first implemented by Southern California Edison and several other utilities in the
1980s and has since been further developed (Jazayeri et al., 2005). In such an energy service
the utility may interrupt power supply to the customer in response to cost considerations
due to unexpected demand spikes or in times of imminent system imbalance. In a particular
implementation presented in Oren (2013, Fig. 1) a the service provider compensates a
customer for both guaranteeing to be able to interrupt the load and for each time of actually
executing the interruption. The number of periods of interruptions is limited to a specific
number of times and hours per year.
A =


1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0

 , B =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0


, Γ =


0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0

 , ∆ =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 (9)
The matrices in (9) reflect the formal description of this energy service7. It carries only a
limited interruption risk, both in duration and frequency. Pricing is non-linear since a reward
for each interruption is added to the traditional linear and static energy rate. There is no
temporal or spatial differentiation. Metering can be implemented in the classic cumulative
manner, while in practice an additional interruption switch can be installed.
On the one hand the customer can manually responds to a signal of the utility as im-
plemented by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (Jazayeri et al., 2005). On the other
hand the utility can access the switch remotely by means of an unidirectional communica-
tion channel as implemented by Minnesota Power (Minnesota Power, 2012). As described
in Section 5.1 we suggest to use a bidirectional communication channel to allow customers
to dynamically change the risk limit. In contrast to the introductory example both latter
7Note that zeros shown greyed out in (9) to (12) are preset as these design options are undefined (see
Figure 2).
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implementations have a simple linear calculation concept (β2,2 = 1).
5.3.2. Real-time electricity pricing
Conveying scarcity by means of price signals is another option to achieve system-wide
power balance. Real-time pricing was first studied by Vickrey (1971) and later applied to
electricity in the 1980s (Schweppe et al., 1988). Advocates argue for the long-run efficiency
gains of real-time pricing (Borenstein, 2005) compared to static prices even though electric-
ity demand is rather inelastic. Besides the ability to reduce peak demand cost-effectively,
economists claim that real-time prices would mitigate market power and reduce price volatil-
ity on wholesale markets.
Real-time pricing programs were first introduced in the early 1990s and already counted
more than 70 offerings in the 2000s (Barbose et al., 2004). In these — mostly voluntary —
programs, retail customers must pay prices that vary over short time intervals (e.g., hourly)
and are published a day or less in advance by utilities. An advanced and puristic program
is offered by the utility Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) in Illinois8. ComEd simply passes
along the average hourly market price with no mark-up to customers who can thus even
partake in negative prices.
A =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 , B =


0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 0 0


, Γ =


0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

 , ∆ =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 (10)
The matrices in (10) shows the formal representation of the morphological box for real-
time pricing. Customers do not carry any risk of service quality or availability since pricing
aspects address the risk component. In the ComEd example the temporally variable prices
are quoted instantaneously. Other programs on the other hand, might have a lead time.
Real-time pricing necessitates continuous metering which is one of the biggest obstacles for its
8https://hourlypricing.comed.com/
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market launch (Costello, 2004). Additionally, most programs include a form of unidirectional
communication to push prices to the metering system.
5.3.3. Deadline-differentiated pricing for EV charging
The second service product example captures more complexity and thus explores further
options in energy service design. In particular, we consider a deadline differentiated pricing
(DDP) approach for an electric vehicle charging service based on Salah and Flath (2016).
Under DDP, energy services are differentiated by the latest time of service delivery. To
compensate delayed service execution, the service provider offers discounts to consumers.
Consumer rebates are increasing in the demand flexibility offered, i.e., a longer accepted
delay until completion of the charging job.
A =


1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0

 , B =


0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 0 0


, Γ =


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0

 , ∆ =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 (11)
Following the parameters and design elements in Figure 2 the DDP energy service can
be formally described by the matrices in (11). This energy service entails no quantity risk,
but a limited, in this case deadline-induced, risk for the particular time of delivery. Since to
date most electric vehicles reject arbitrary power profiles or even interruptions, the energy
service features no interruption risk and a fully fixed power profile (δ2,1 = 1). The service
provider announces price changes at latest at the time of arrival at the car park and therefore
with lead time. The calculation concept is linear, while the calculation unit will typically
be charging energy. Price levels are subject to change depending on grid and generation
conditions. A given charging service will typically be location-bound (e.g., a given parking
complex) and hence does not facilitate spatial differentiation.
Continuous metering is necessary to facilitate DDP due to possible price changes. Like-
wise, bidirectional communication will be required to exchange and confirm price informa-
tion. Besides the physical connection between grid and vehicle, the charging process is auto-
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mated according to the established specifications with service delivery being terminated as
soon as the agreed charging level is reached. Finally, the electricity properties will typically
exclude both differentiation by energy source and extended power quality requirements.
Bitar and Low (2012), Nayyar et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2015) present generalised
versions of this energy service that abstracts from the EV charging context. In these cases
restrictions on interruption (α2,2 = 1) and power profile alteration (δ2,3 = 1) of contracted
loads are loosened.
5.3.4. Local energy market
Unlike regular tariff relationships where suppliers and customers agree on conditions for
several transactions, local energy markets are characterised by repeated spot transactions
with allocation and prices arising from bids and asks of market participants. Consequently,
a sizeable share of system risk is transferred to the demand side — either in the form of
price risk (guaranteed delivery may be risky in the presence of price spikes) or quantity risk
(limit prices curtail price risk but may lead to non-execution). In the 1980s the seminal
work on optimal spot pricing (Schweppe et al., 1981; Schweppe, 1988) conceptualised lo-
cal energy markets as an advanced form of energy service intermediation. Diverse research
projects (e.g., Hammerstrom et al., 2007; Giordano et al., 2011) showcased prototype im-
plementations. A wide-scale adoption of smart grids will create the technological basis for
establishing energy marketplaces outside of small-scale experimental settings. Consequently,
recent research in energy and computational economics has revisited the design challenges
embedded in creating and rolling out such local energy markets (Ketter et al., 2013; Lund
et al., 2012; Stro¨hle and Flath, 2016) or how to adapt them to specific scenarios like electric
vehicle charging (De Craemer and Deconinck, 2012; Dauer et al., 2013).
A =


0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1

 , B =


0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


, Γ =


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 , ∆ =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 (12)
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Again, the morphological approach lends itself to characterise this form of energy service.
Here, we assume a market with limit orders on (partial) service completion, i.e., customers
specify the maximum price which they are willing to pay for a tendered energy service
(fragment). If prices exceed this reservation limit orders will not be executed resulting in
unlimited quantity risk. This unlimited quantity risk also corresponds to unlimited delivery
time risk. In this market setup there is no interruption risk of an individual market trans-
action. However, repeated transactions are uncertain to be repeatedly allocated leading to
a limited amount of interruption risk.
Price changes are instantaneous after each market clearing with a linear relationship be-
tween price and energy. Prices vary over time and apply only to the given marketplace. As
noted above, local energy markets have significant infrastructure requirements. Continuous
metering and bi-directional communication are necessary to facilitate and monitor market
transactions. At the same time customers will most likely be relying on trading agents to
pursue their energy trading activity (Vytelingum et al., 2010; Gottwalt et al., 2011). Finally,
local marketplaces will need sufficient market liquidity to be successful. Consequently, com-
moditised energy services with minimal specifications should be traded (Stro¨hle and Flath,
2016).
5.4. Prototypical decision support system
The above formalisation of the morphological box lends itself to facilitating a decision
support system for energy service designers. Such a system should guide practitioners by
dynamically restricting design choices according to feasibility constraints and thereby im-
proves the focus of the product development process. To illustrate this idea we implemented
a prototype for such a decision support system using Microsoft Excel and Visual Basic (left
side of Figure 3). Users can interactively select service design elements in the morpholog-
ical box. Furthermore, they can specify a maximum complexity level for the final energy
service. After any decision the system dynamically updates dependencies arising from this
decision, updates the current complexity level, and restricts future choices to remain within
the complexity “budget.”
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Figure 3: User journey through a prototypical decision support system
The right side of Figure 3 illustrates the system functionality by means of two exemplary
user journeys through the tool. The upper branch highlights the effect of interdependen-
cies between design elements: After selecting “limited quantity risk (partial execution)”
the system disables the “no communication” and “unidirectional communication” infras-
tructure design elements and automatically sets the only remaining infrastructure design
element “bidirectional communication”. Furthermore, after choosing to use a renewable
energy source on a “power balance” level, in which case an unlimited interruption risk is
inherent (compare Equation 6), the parameter “interruption risk” is fixed to ”unlimited”.
Besides, both choices deplete a minor part of the complexity allowance.
The lower branch demonstrates the effect of the energy service complexity limit. Due
to selecting “variable temporal differentiation” of the price, on the one hand, an inter-
dependency occurs (see Equation 2 for “continuous metering”), and on the other hand a
“non-linear calculation concept” as well as a “fully variable power profile” becomes indis-
pensable as selecting it would exceed the previously selected maximum complexity level.
After selecting “nodal pricing” the maximum complexity level is reached. Therefore, the
tool deactivates all other complexity driving design elements. Please note that complexity
weights are exemplary in this case.
These user journeys illustrate how decision support systems for energy service design
can utilise the morphological box. The presented prototype focuses on reducing the choice
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through constraint and interdependency propagation. A proper implementation in practice
should also consider the benefit side of the various design elements (additional profits or
cost reductions) to help in determining the most beneficial service offering. To that end,
the system should be connected with other corporate information systems (CRM, ERP) and
augmented by suitable benefit-assessment-components, e.g., a simulation tool as presented
by Gottwalt et al. (2011).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
Energy services play a central role to empower the currently mostly passive demand
side. This demand side activation is crucial to cope with the risk that arises from a growing
share of electricity supply from intermittent renewable energy sources (Papaefthymiou and
Dragoon, 2016). Utility companies have started to increase efforts for product development
that addresses the new situation in the power system, but there is still a lack of experience
and effective methods and tools to support this development (Richter, 2013).
This paper is a first step to set a frame for the structured design of energy services.
It proposes a systematic and standardised way to address different product characteristics
and their design options, with a particular focus on differentiation options with respect to
quality of service attributes. This way, new and innovative combinations of service design
options can support activating the flexibility potential of the demand side in a Smart Grid
environment and ameliorate some of the supply risk inherent to intermittent generation.
We illustrate pricing options for these (new) energy service products which improves
setting the correct incentives for the desired customer behavior and outline infrastructural
needs and additional product properties which depend on the specific use case. We then
apply the approach by modelling exemplary reference energy service products. Furthermore,
we discuss how the morphological approach can be formalised by means of a mathematical
programming formulation. Formally describing interdependencies between product design
elements increases efficiency by removing incompatible design options. Additionally, we
introduce a complexity measure which facilitates assessing potential adoption obstacles for
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end customers. Finally, we illustrate the theoretical concepts by means of a prototypical
decision support system for service designers.
6.1. Policy implications
The economic viability of cost-based electricity pricing with respect to generation ad-
equacy is lively debated in the face of growing renewable generation shares. So far, the
debate has mainly focused on supply side initiatives, e.g., the establishment of capacity
markets (Boute, 2012; Browne et al., 2015; Hall, 2014).
However, near zero variable costs also call for a value-based pricing of energy services as a
new paradigm. To this end, pricing should be determined by individual customers’ valuation
for particular service characteristics. Quality-based energy service product differentiation
facilitates efficient customer self-selection in response to a change in product characteristics.
This enables better participation of numerous flexible loads which jointly can help stabilise
the power system (Gottwalt et al., 2016). The micro-transactions arising from these micro-
flexibilities are facilitated by ICT capabilities offered in smart grid environments. The central
idea is to (partially) limit supply security by means of active, demand-side risk sharing to
stabilise supply security in the long term. Note that such an approach may loosen the
current barriers between grids and energy markets in unbundled markets (Greening, 2010).
While it may take some more time until extreme RES penetration scenarios are realised,
power markets and infrastructures will have to prepare for these challenges in advance (Math-
iesen et al., 2011). Consequently, regulators must pave the way for an environment where
a flexible demand side can choose from a richer set of differentiated energy services. This
requires establishing a technological infrastructure that enables such a shift. These smart
grid platforms must be non-discriminatory and equally accessible for established and new
actors to allow for efficient competition. Similarly, some basic energy service with prede-
fined quality characteristics should still be offered for those customers unable or willing to
respond to quality differentiated energy service products. To foster this kind of innovation,
regulators may need to adopt a more tolerant regulation regime and thus lower the barriers
for new market entrants.
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The telecommunication sector developed in an analogous way to the energy sector after
liberalisation (Hertzog, 2010; Smith, 2012). Telecommunication companies with differing val-
ues were initially founded to account for the customers’ different valuations for service qual-
ity. Both the range of service quality differentiation options and the robust adaption of the
regulatory frame in the telecommunication sector should inspire the energy sector (Bourreau
and Doan, 2001). One of the ideas that needs further investigation with respect to its impli-
cation in the energy service sector is flat rate pricing. Imagine a theoretically unconstrained
energy consumption for a particular service while only a fixed, consumption-independent
rate is paid. At the same time the quality of supply or in particular the availability of
energy from an intermittent source can be a quality differentiation characteristic that only
allows flexible consumers (or appliances) to utilise this flat rate energy service. Further
work must thus be dedicated to the comparison between the telecommunication and energy
sector.
6.2. Outlook
We have argued that product differentiation is important to retain economic viability
of power systems dominated by renewable energy sources. Our research focused on the
conceptual side of service innovation. However, going forward, the economic viability as
well as suitable regulatory frameworks have to be evaluated and designed. Therefore, future
work should seek to better understand the costs and benefits of individual design options.
This will facilitate a proper service design optimisation as envisioned in Section 5.
Introducing interactive decision support systems as illustrated in 5.4 will allow product
designers to focus on creative aspects rather than thinking about formal limitations and
interdependencies. To help practitioners transfer our ideas into industry applications the
prototypical decision support system needs to be expanded and adapted to specific use
cases. Ideally, the tool should allow designers to start by developing and parametrising the
morphological box and specify interdependencies in a higher level description language.
Another key question is how fast and to what extent service providers can face customers
with product differentiation of an originally homogeneous good. Surveys and experimental
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approaches are needed to assess customer acceptance and to develop robust estimates of
the complexity scores introduced in Section 5.2. Additionally, customers’ risk aversion will
influence the acceptance of tariffs designed with our methodology. To formulate promising
business cases, practitioners would benefit from a way to take the risk preferences of specific
customer groups into account.
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